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Abstract
In order to explore the optimal taxation of low-skilled labor, we
extend the standard model of optimal non-linear income taxation in
the presence of quasi-linear preferences in leisure by allowing for invol-
untary unemployment, job search and an exogenous welfare benefit.
In trading off low-skilled employment against work effort of higher
skilled workers, the government balances distortions on the search
margin with those on work effort. Higher welfare benefits typically
reduce taxes paid by low-skilled workers and raise marginal tax rates
throughout the skill distribution.
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1 Introduction
Widening wage dispersion raises the question how public policy should pro-
tect the living standards of unskilled workers, as policy makers are increas-
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ingly concerned about the adverse incentive effects of generous income sup-
port. In response to these concerns, many countries have cut taxes on un-
skilled work in order to combat poverty while at the same time encouraging
unskilled workers to look for work. Both the United States and several Euro-
pean countries have already introduced or are considering in-work tax bene-
fits for unskilled work in the form of an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).
These tax policies are part of active labor-market policies and ’welfare-to-
work’ programs, where governments fight poverty by raising employment of
unskilled workers.
To investigate the optimal response of tax policy to income support pro-
vided through the welfare system and to declining relative wages of unskilled
labor, we extend the standard model of optimal non-linear income taxation
developed by Mirrlees (1971). In particular, we incorporate labor-market
imperfections that induce governments to provide income support, namely
search costs and involuntary unemployment.
In the presence of a search margin, the government has to account for
not only the standard incentive compatibility constraint on work effort, but
also a participation constraint on the willingness of low-skilled agents to
look for work. Indeed, from an analytical point of view, our main con-
tribution is to add a participation constraint to the optimal tax problem,
including the decision regarding which types should optimally participate in
job search. In doing so, we extend both the optimal tax literature, which
typically abstracts from participation constraints, and the literature on op-
timal non-linear monopoly pricing, which generally assumes that the lowest
participating type is exogenously given. Within a non-linear pricing frame-
work, Rochet and Stole (2002) recently added an endogenous participation
constraint by allowing agents to differ in both outside options and prefer-
ences for quality. Our analysis deviates from that of Rochet and Stole (2002)
in two respects. First, in the non-linear pricing problem explored in Ro-
chet and Stole (2002), the monopolist cares only about profits earned on the
participating agents. In our optimal tax problem, in contrast, also agents
who do not participate appear in the objective function because the govern-
ment is interested in the utilities of both participating and nonparticipating
types. The second difference with Rochet and Stole (2002) is that we allow
agents to differ in only one dimension; agents feature different skill levels
but exhibit the same search costs. Within the context of our labor-market
application, this is a reasonable assumption, which is in fact employed by
most of the labor-market literature on search (see, for instance, Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999)). This assumption implies that the participation con-
straint is binding only at the bottom of the skill distribution. Rochet and
Stole (2002), in contrast, derive a binding participation constraint for each
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type.
The literature on optimal income taxation has modelled unemployment
of unskilled agents as these agents reducing the hours they work in their jobs
when they face low gross wages and rapidly rising marginal tax rates. Ac-
cordingly, low productivity workers are bunched in low- or zero-production
jobs. By introducing a participation margin and positive search costs, we
model another type of bunching at the bottom of the skill distribution: un-
skilled agents do not search for work and thus drop out of the labor force.
Heckman (1993), for instance, stressed that ’a crucial theoretical distinction
with important empirical pay off is that between labor supply choices at the
extensive margin ( ...) and choices at the intensive margin’. Empirical work
does in fact reveal that unskilled workers adjust their labor supply in response
to tax and benefit programs on mainly the extensive margin (i.e. leaving the
labor force altogether, for example through early retirement) rather than the
intensive margin (i.e. reducing the hours they work in their jobs) (see, e.g.
Eissa and Liebman (1996), Kimmel and Kniesners (1998), Blundell (2001),
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) and Meyer (2002)). This explains the policy
concern about welfare programs and high taxes on unskilled work discourag-
ing low-income earners from looking for work. Indeed, our model is consistent
with the stylized fact that low-skilled agents feature the highest long-term
unemployment rates (see OECD (2001)).
Also Saez (2002) incorporates the two labor-supply margins of not only
hours worked but also labor-force participation in an optimal income tax
model.1 Our approach differs from that of Saez in three important respects.
First of all, whereas Saez assumes that all unemployed have voluntarily left
the labor force, we account also for involuntary unemployment. Whereas
allowing for unemployment risk does not complicate the analysis, it provides
an implicit justification for substantial welfare benefits. Agents thus face two
risks: being born with low ability and being involuntarily unemployed. More
generally, we are more explicit than Saez (2002) about the labor-market
imperfections affecting the costs and effectiveness of labor-market search,
including the welfare implications of these imperfections.
Our analysis differs from Saez (2002) also in that the government takes
the welfare benefit as exogenously given when optimizing the tax system.
Hence, the government can employ only the non-linear income tax to optimize
social welfare. Indeed, in practice, taxes and social assistance are often set
1Diamond (1980) and Choné and Laroque (2002) incorporate a participation margin in
an optimal tax framework in which work effort is exogenous so that the intensive margin
is absent. Our paper is similar to Saez (2002) in that we model both the intensive and
extensive margins of labor supply, allowing us to explore the interaction between these
two labor-supply margins.
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by distinct agencies based on rather different interests and considerations.
In some federal countries, for example, local governments determine social
assistance benefits, while the central government is mainly responsible for the
tax system. One can also interpret the minimum income floor set by social
assistance benefits as being determined by considerations outside our model.
Alternatively, one can view our analysis as exploring how the tax system can
be employed to address the possibly sub-optimal aspects of social assistance.
A final difference is that Saez (2002) allows for more general preferences
that are not necessarily quasi-linear in leisure. Whereas his results are thus
more general than ours, our specific assumptions on preferences enable us to
derive more analytical results on comparative statics with respect to pub-
lic spending, labor-market imperfections (such as the costs and effectiveness
of search) and institutional features of the welfare system. This sheds ad-
ditional light on the determinants of the optimal tax schedule. Indeed, a
substantial literature (see, e.g., Boadway, Cuff and Marchand (2000), Ebert
(1992), Weymark (1986, 1987), and Lollivier and Rochet (1983)) has turned
to quasi-linear preferences in leisure in order to obtain more intuition for the
determinants of the optimal non-linear income tax, as these preferences allow
for closed-form solutions of the standard optimal non-linear income tax prob-
lem. Our quasi-linear preferences also imply that a utilitarian government
cares about the distribution of consumption rather than the distribution of
work effort. Indeed, policy debates typically focus on raising consumption
rather than reducing work effort of the poor.
We extend the literature on optimal non-linear income taxation with
quasi-linear preferences in three ways; we allow for involuntary unemploy-
ment, a participation (or search) constraint, and an exogenous welfare bene-
fit. These three extensions make this literature more relevant for addressing
the timely policy question of how the optimal tax system should treat low-
skilled employment in the face of income support. The participation margin
also eliminates some of the unrealistic implications of a model with quasi-
linear preferences for aggregate labor supply elasticities. Hence, the intro-
duction of a participation margin is particularly important in the context of
this particular model.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. After section 2 introduces
the model, section 3 sets out the optimal tax problem. In exploring the
consequences of a binding participation margin, section 4 discusses, among
other things, how labor-market imperfections and the features of the welfare
system impact the optimal income tax. Section 5 concludes. The main results
are proved in the appendix. The proofs of some auxiliary results can be found




The economy is populated with agents featuring homogenous preferences
but heterogeneous skills. A worker of ability (or skill or efficiency level) n
working y hours (or providing y units of work effort) supplies ny efficiency
units of homogeneous labor. With constant unitary labor productivity, these
efficiency units are transformed in the same number of units of output. We
select output as the numeraire. The before-tax wage per hour is thus given
by exogenous skill n. Hence, overall gross output produced by a worker of
skill n, z(n), amounts to z(n) = ny(n). Since workers collect only labor
income, this gross output z(n) corresponds to the gross (i.e. before-tax) labor
income earned by a worker of that skill n. The density of agents of ability
n is denoted by f(n), and F (n) represents the corresponding cumulative
distribution function. The support of the distribution of abilities is given by
[n0, n1],
2 while f (.) is differentiable and satisfies 1− n0f (n0) > 0.
Workers share the following quasi-linear utility function over consumption
x and hours worked (or work effort) y
u(x, y) = v (x)− y,
where v(x) is increasing and strictly concave: v0 (x) > 0, v00 (x) < 0 for all
x ≥ 0. Furthermore, v (0) = 0, limx↓0 v0 (x) = ∞, limx−→+∞ v0 (x) = 0 and
limx→+∞ v (x)−xv0 (x) = +∞. The concavity of v(.) implies that agents are
risk averse and thus want to obtain insurance against the risks of involuntary
unemployment and a low earning capacity n. The specific cardinalization
of the utility function affects the distributional preferences of a utilitarian
government. In particular, the concavity of v(.) implies that a utilitarian
government aims to fight poverty. In other words, such a government wants
to insure agents against the risk of a low consumption level.
As in Lollivier and Rochet (1983), Weymark (1987), Ebert (1992), and
Boadway, Cuff and Marchand (2000), utility is linear in work effort y and
separable in work effort and consumption x. This has four important con-
sequences. First, consumption x is not affected by income effects. A higher
average tax rate thus induces households to raise work effort y rather than
to cut consumption x. Second, the single-crossing (or sorting) property is
met, implying that the incentive compatibility constraints can be replaced by
2The finite upper bound of the skill distribution n1 implies that the optimal marginal
tax rate is zero at the top of the income distribution (see Sadka (1976) and Seade (1977)).
Diamond (1998) considers various unbouded distributions, including the Pareto distribu-
tion for skills above the mode. We focus on the bottom rather than the top of the skill
distribution and therefore do not extensively consider the sensitivity of our results with
respect to the distribution of skills at the top of the skill distribution.
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(much simpler) monotonicity conditions on x (.) and z (.) (see, for instance,
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). Third, the specific quasi-linear utility function
allows for a closed-form solution of the standard optimal income tax problem.
Fourth, a utilitarian government cares only about aggregate work effort in
the economy. Such a government thus aims at an equal distribution of con-
sumption (i.e. the alleviation of poverty) rather than an equal distribution
of work effort over the various agents. Indeed, Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala
(1994) observe that policy debates focus on raising consumption rather than
reducing work effort (or increasing leisure) of the poor. However, whereas
Kanbur, Keen, and Tuomala (1994) adopt a non-welfarist social welfare func-
tion to do justice to this policy concern of fighting poverty, we continue in
the welfarist tradition but assume a special, quasi-linear utility function.
In line with the optimal income tax literature, the government is assumed
not to be able to observe skills n but to know the distribution function f(n)
and before-tax income of each individual z(n). We depart from the standard
optimal tax literature by incorporating non-verifiable job search: agents have
to search for a job and the government cannot verify search intensities. In
particular, we allow agents to adjust their labor supply on not only the
intensive margin (i.e. by varying hours of work) but also the extensive margin
(i.e. by deciding whether or not to look for a job). In particular, by searching
with intensity s ∈ [0, 1], agents find a job with probability s. Search costs
γ(s) are given by
γ(s) =
½
γs if s ∈ [0, s̄]
+∞ otherwise,
where γ ≥ 0 is a parameter representing the magnitude of the search costs.
s̄ < 1 captures the idea that agents can fail to find a job, even though they
search at full capacity s̄. By modelling the costs and effectiveness of search,
the parameters γ and (1− s̄) represent labor-market imperfections that give
rise to unemployment. Agents thus differ in both ability n and employment
status and face two types of risks: being born with low ability n and being
involuntarily unemployed.
If an agent does not succeed in finding a job, (s)he receives a welfare
(or social assistance) benefit b ≥ 0.3 Since the government cannot observe
3An alternative interpretation of b is a categorial unemployment insurance benefit.
Indeed, the benefit is paid only to those who have not found a job. In most countries,
however, unemployment benefits depend on the previously earned wage incomes and are
thus likely to increase with ability n. This is the main reason why we interpret b as a social
assistance payment, i.e. the minimum income level provided by the government. Another
interpretation of b is an early retirement or disability benefit that is paid if an agent does
not have a job.
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the abilities and search intensities of unemployed agents,4 the welfare benefit
does not depend on n and is exogenously given to the agent. An agent of
ability n thus selects search intensity s to maximize expected utility
U(n) = max
s
{−γ(s) + su(n) + (1− s) v (b)}
where u (n) denotes the utility of having a job for a worker of type n. Sub-
stituting in the search cost function γ (s) introduced above, one can easily
verify that the optimal choice of s for type n amounts to
s (n) =
½
0 if u (n) < γ + v (b)
s̄ if u (n) ≥ γ + v (b) . (1)
The linear specification of the search cost function thus implies that a worker
either does not search at all and is voluntarily unemployed or that he searches
at the level s̄ (and faces a probability of (1 − s̄) of involuntary unemploy-
ment). We refer to the constraint u (n) ≥ γ + v (b) as the participation or
individual rationality constraint. The government has to respect this par-
ticipation constraint because it cannot observe search. A special case of our
model is a regular labor-supply model with fixed costs of work, e.g. child
care costs. In particular, without involuntary unemployment (i.e. s̄ = 1),
the parameter γ can be interpreted as these fixed costs of entering the labor
market. Indeed, an agent enters the labor market by actively looking for a
job only if the additional pay-off from work, u(n) − v(b), exceeds the fixed
entry cost γ. Positive entry costs introduce a difference between stopping to
work on the intensive and extensive margins of labor supply: working zero
hours in a job (i.e. responding on the intensive margin) is different from
staying outside the labor force by not looking for a job (i.e. responding on
the extensive margin). Unemployment risk (i.e. s̄ < 1) justifies substantial
welfare benefits b. This generalization of the standard model comes at no
analytical cost.
After a worker has found a job, (s)he has to determine her work effort.
Instead of working with work effort y(n) and consumption x(n) as the instru-
ments of the worker, we write the utility function in terms of gross income
(or output) z(n) ≡ ny(n) and net income (or consumption) x(n). Utility of
type n is then written as u(n) ≡ v (x(n))− z(n)/n. The ex-post utility of a
type n agent who finds a job is determined by type n’s choice of gross income
z:











4The government, however, can observe whether or not an agent has found a job.
Hence, we do not require that b = T̃ (0), where T̃ (z) is the tax schedule as a function of
gross income.
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where T̃ (z) denotes the tax schedule as a function of gross income z. We can
write T (n) = T̃ (z (n)) since type n chooses gross income z (n) in equilibrium.





The government maximizes ex-ante expected utility (i.e. expected utility
before the search effort has been made and therefore before labor market




[−γs (n) + s(n)u(n) + (1− s (n)) v (b)] f(n)φ(n)dn.
We normalize the rank-order weights φ(n) such that
R n1
n0
f(n)φ(n) = 1, and
assume φ0(n) ≤ 0.5 The government is utilitarian if the rank-order weights
are constant, i.e. φ(n) = 1 for all n. This is the usual assumption adopted
in the literature on optimal non-linear income taxation in the presence of
preferences that are quasi-linear in leisure (see Lollivier and Rochet (1983),
Weymark (1987), Ebert (1992), and Boadway, Cuff, and Marchand (2000)6).
If the welfare weights are declining (i.e. φ0(n) < 0), the government is con-
cerned about the distribution of not only consumption but also leisure (or
work effort).
The government has to respect the following budget constraintZ n1
n0
f (n) s (n) [b+ T (n)]dn = E + b, (4)
where E represents exogenously given exhaustive government expenditure,
and T (n) ≡ z (n) − x (n) denotes the tax paid by type n. The government
can employ only the non-linear income tax to optimize social welfare and
takes public spending E and the welfare benefit as given. Note that the
government’s financial balance improves by T (n) + b if a worker of type n
finds a job. Alternatively, from the worker’s point of view, T (n)+b represents
the implicit tax rate on entering the labor market by engaging in search. If
T (n) + b < 0, entry is subsidized for type n.
5The rank-order weights depend on ability n rather than utility u(n). This approach,
which involves non-welfarists elements, allows us to derive a closed-form solution for the
standard optimal tax problem. Atkinson (1995) defends this assumption by noting that
empirical measures of inequality are based on the distribution of gross wages n rather than
utilities.
6This paper considers also a maxi-min objective function where the government cares
only about the least able persons (i.e. agents with skill n0). This is the special case of our
formulation in which φ(n) = 0 for n > n0.
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3 The optimal tax problem
In optimizing social welfare, the government faces the incentive compatibility
constraint (3), the participation constraint (1), and the government budget
constraint (4). In addition, labor supply and therefore before-tax income
should be non-negative
z(n) ≥ 0. (5)
Morover, the second-order condition for the agents’ optimal choice of con-
sumption and gross income implies that consumption and gross income are
non-decreasing in type n (see, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: the-
orem 7.2) or Boone and Bovenberg (2002: lemma 1))
z0(n) ≥ 0. (6)
Instead of x (n) , we employ u (n) as a control variable in order to facilitate
the inclusion of incentive compatibility (3) into our optimization problem.7
To incorporate the monotonicity constraint (6), we introduce a non-negative
variable ω (n) ≡ z0(n) determining how fast z (n) rises with ability n. This












−λz (n) [z0 (n)− ω (n)]− η (n) (γ − u(n) + v(b))
+λEf(n) [s (n) (T (n) + b)− b−E]− δ (n) [0− z (n)]
 dn,
where T (n) ≡ z (n) − x (n) = z (n) − v−1
³
u (n) + z(n)
n
´
. λu (n) and λz (n)
represent the Lagrange multipliers of the first-order compatibility constraint
and the monotonicity constraint, λE stands for the multiplier of the gov-
ernment budget constraint, η (n) denotes the multiplier of the participation
constraint, and δ (n) is the Lagrange multiplier of the non-negativity con-
straint on before-tax income (5).
To further simplify the optimization problem, we observe that, since
z (n) ≥ 0, incentive compatibility (3) implies that utilities do not decline
with skill (i.e. u0 (n) ≥ 0). Accordingly, if the participation constraint
u (n) ≥ γ + v (b) is met for skill n̄, it is met also for all higher skills n > n̄.
7This is the usual approach in optimal non-linear income tax problems introduced by
Mirrlees (1971). If preferences are quasi linear in leisure, however, it is more convenient
to employ x(n) and nu(n) rather than z(n) and u(n) as controls; see Boadway, Cuff, and
Marchand (2000). We stick to the Mirrlees approach because we gain less by departing
from it, due the introduction of a participation constraint on u(n).
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Defining nw as the lowest skill looking for work, we thus have s (n) = 0 for
n < nw and s (n) = s̄ for n ≥ nw. Accordingly, our model is consistent
with the stylized fact that the extensive margin of labor-supply responses is
especially relevant for low-income earners. Empirical work does show that
these workers respond to tax and benefit programs mainly on the extensive
rather than the intensive margin of labor supply. This explains the policy
concern that generous benefit programs and taxes on low earnings discourage
low-income earners from looking for work.
The agents with skill n < nw can be viewed as being voluntarily unem-
ployed. In our model in which all agents feature the same preferences, the
lower skills n < nw are voluntarily unemployed, whereas the higher skills
n > nw all look for work but may be involuntarily unemployed (if s̄ < 1).
This is in contrast to Saez (2002), who assumes that agents differ not only
in skill levels but also in preferences for full-time leisure. In his setting, all
unemployment is voluntary — with unemployed agents exhibiting a higher
preference for full-time leisure than the employed agents of the same skill
do. Hence, voluntary unemployment is related to not only skill levels but
also preferences. In both Saez (2002) and our model, higher skilled agents
may be unemployed, but for different reasons. Whereas in Saez (2002) the
higher skilled agents without work value leisure highly and thus do not look
for work, in our model these agents actively search for work but have been
unfortunate enough not to have found a suitable job.


















−λz (n) [z0 (n)− ω (n)] + λE [f(n)s̄T (n)] + δ (n) z (n)
)
dn
−λE {b [F (nw) + (1− F (nw)) (1− s̄)] + E}
−ηw (γ − u(nw) + v(b)) ,
where F̄ (nw) ≡
R nw
n0
φ(n)f(n)dn. ηw denotes the Lagrange multiplier on
the participation constraint for type nw. It measures the social value of in-
creasing employment by forcing more people to search, and can therefore
be interpreted as the value of a work test (and the required information on
search intensity) inducing more skills to look for work. The financial gain to
the government of inducing type nw to search for work equals s̄ [T (nw) + b]
and [T (nw) + b] equals the implicit tax on search for type nw.
The shadow values λz (n) , δ (n) , ηw are associated with three types of
bunching. λz (n) < 0 (implying ω (n) ≡ z0(n) = 0) corresponds to the case
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in which z(n) and x(n) are constant over a range of skills. We call this
bunching due to violation of monotonicity. Also the case δ (n) > 0 implies
that gross and net incomes are constant over a range of skills. In contrast
to bunching on account of violation of monotonicity, however, gross incomes
z(n) are necessarily zero over this range, so that utility is constant over the
bunching interval (see (3) with z(n) = 0). This is called z = 0 bunching.
The search margin gives rise to an additional type of bunching, namely the
case in which nw > n0 and ηw 6= 0. Accordingly, types n0 ≤ n < nw do not
search. Hence, as voluntarily unemployed, they are bunched without any
labor income and collect social assistance b. This we call s = 0 bunching.
Just as z = 0 bunching, s = 0 bunching can occur only at the bottom of the
skill distribution.
This paper focuses on the third type of bunching because three reasons
make the first two types of bunching unconvincing formalizations of the bot-
tom of the labor market.8 First, as mentioned in the introduction, empirical
research strongly suggests that the extensive labor supply margin is impor-
tant, especially for unskilled labor. Second, in the case of bunching due to
violation of monotonicity, government spending E and welfare benefits b af-
fect neither marginal tax rates nor unemployment (see Boone and Bovenberg
(2002)), which is unrealistic. Third, in the case of z = 0 bunching, welfare
benefits do impact unemployment and marginal tax rates but in a counter-
intuitive way: a higher benefit level lowers unemployment (see Boone and
Bovenberg (2002)).
4 Unemployment on the extensive margin
This section explores the case in which the extensive labor supply margin is
binding (i.e. u(nw) = v(b) + γ and ηw 6= 0).9 Sub-section 4.1 first considers
the normal case in which the implicit tax rate on search at the bottom of
the labor market is positive (T (nw) + b > 0), after which sub-section 4.2
investigates how higher public spending and welfare benefits affect optimal
tax policy in this case. Sub-section 4.3, finally, shows that with a binding
8This is true even though the first two types of bunching allow for positive marginal
tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution. With z = 0 bunching, the unskilled
do not work positive hours. This may be interpreted as unemployment.
9This section assumes that the monotonicity constraint is met. With a binding search
margin, violation of the monotonicity constraint is less likely. The reason is that the
search margin takes those agents out of the labor market who, in the absence of a search
margin, would be bunched on account of the violation of the monotonicity constraint.
With positive search costs and a binding search constraint, z = 0 bunching cannot occur
(see Boone and Bovenberg (2002), Lemma 3).
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participation margin the lowest participating type may actually be subsidized
on work (T (nw) + b < 0).
4.1 Solution optimal tax problem
With an interior solution for nw, the government finds it optimal not to
encourage the least able agents to search for a job; these agents thus remain
voluntarily unemployed. Types n0 ≤ n < nw are bunched without any
labor income and instead collect the welfare benefit b. Consequently, the
government employs passive welfare benefits instead of active labor-market
policies to fight the poverty of these low-skilled agents. The lower bound on
the observed wage distribution nw can be viewed as the effective minimum
wage (or wage floor) implied by the welfare benefit b and the taxes on labor
income.
With an interior solution for nw, we find a strikingly simple expression
determining the marginal worker
b+ T (nw) = τ(nw)z(nw). (8)
where τ (nw) is the marginal tax rate faced by type nw, or equivalently τ (nw)
represents the tax distortion on the intensive (hours) margin. The equation
says that for the marginal worker (with skill nw) the distortion on the ex-
tensive margin (i.e. the implicit marginal tax rate between non-employment
and employment on the left-hand side of (8)) should equal the distortion
on the intensive margin (i.e. the right-hand side of (8)).10 To understand
this equation, one should first note that the marginal type nw is indifferent
between participating and not participating in the labor market so that en-
couraging this type to look for a job yields no first-order welfare effects for
this type. Hence, this agent’s utility does not enter the equation determining
nw, and external effects of changes in employment on the government budget
determine the optimal employment level. The left-hand side of (8) represents
the direct budgetary implications of raising employment by reducing nw: by
bringing a marginal worker into work, the government saves the welfare ben-
efit b and collects additional tax revenue T (nw). The budgetary implications
of behavioral changes of other workers are captured by the right-hand side
of (8)). Bringing a marginal type nw into work encourages workers who are
marginally more skilled to work less hours — as they can now more easily
10This expression can be stated as b+T (nw)z(nw) = τ(nw), where the left-hand side is closely
related to the replacement rate (in after-tax terms). b+T (nw)z(nw) indicates which part of gross
labor income in a marginal job z(nw) is taxed away through withdrawn welfare benefits b
and additional labor taxes T (nw).
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mimic type nw.11 The optimal tax system balances the budgetary implica-
tions of this latter behavioral response on the intensive margin of the more
productive workers (represented by the right-hand side of (8)) with the bud-
getary implications of the behavioral response on the extensive margin of
the marginal workers (represented by the left-hand side of (8)). The govern-
ment thus faces a trade-off between obtaining revenues from either inducing
more agents to search or encouraging a smaller group of agents to work more
hours. One can state this dilemma also as one between raising production
through more employment or raising it through a higher productivity level
(interpreting y as work effort rather than hours worked), or, alternatively,
as a trade-off between increasing labor supply on the extensive margin and
raising it on the intensive margin.
We characterize the solution to the optimal tax problem in two parts.
First, we explain what determines the marginal type nw and the marginal
cost of public funds λE. Proposition 3 derives the expressions for the marginal
tax rate, utility and production levels for each type n and overall welfare.
Lemma 1 With voluntary unemployment (i.e. nw > n0), the solution can
be characterized as follows
v0 (xw) =
v (xw)− v (b)− γ
xw − b , (9)
λE =
G (n1)−G (nw)
1− F (nw)− nwf (nw) + f(nw)v0(xw)
, (10)




{[tf (t)− [1− F (t)]] v (x (t))− x (t) f (t)} dt










and x (n) is determined by




+ f (n)n− [1− F (n)] , (12)
for n ≥ nw and xw = x(nw).
The solution satisfies the properties xw > b, nw ∈ hn0, n1i, λE > 0, and (if
11If the government could observe skills, it would eliminate the search distortion of
the marginal worker (i.e. b + T (nw) = 0) because it does not need to worry about the
implications of a zero implicit tax rate between work and non-work for the intensive margin













The system is recursive in that equation (9) determining the consumption
level of the marginal worker, xw = x(nw), depends on neither λE nor nw. As
shown in the appendix, this expression is equivalent to (8). It determines the
minimum production level (and given the binding participation constraint
also the minimum consumption level) that makes it worthwhile for the gov-
ernment to encourage an agent to search for work and thus employ active
labor-market policies rather than welfare benefits as an instrument to allevi-
ate poverty. Production in a marginal job needs to be sufficient to offset the
search costs and the implied decline in production of more efficient workers.
The consumption level xw can thus be viewed as the reservation income for
the government to have agents search.
To see what determines the consumption gap between the lowest working
type and the unemployed, xw− b, we substitute the Taylor expansion v(b) =
v(xw)+v
0(xw)(b−xw)+1/2v00(ξ)(b−xw)2 (where b < ξ < xw) into (9). This
yields γ = −1/2v00(ξ)(b−xw)2, so that reservation consumption is a mark-up




The optimal gap between the consumption level of marginal workers, xw, and
that of the unemployed, b, thus depends on search costs γ and the concavity
of utility from consumption, v(.).12 Large search costs imply that marginal
workers need to be rather productive (and thus enjoy relatively high con-
sumption levels) in order to make it worthwhile to have them search for a
job. A concave utility function, in contrast, implies that unequal consump-
tion levels of x and b become rather costly. Hence, the government optimally
contains the gap between consumption of workers and the unemployed.
We find the optimum by deriving two relationships between λE and the
marginal skill nw. In (nw, λE) space (as illustrated in figure 1), labor sup-
ply (10), denoted by LS, is upward sloping13 and the government budget
12By reducing xw, a more concave utility function shifts up equation (10) in (nw, λE)
space, thereby raising λE and hence (from (15)) marginal tax rates. This result contrasts
with bunching due to violation of monotonicity and z = 0 bunching in which λE and
marginal tax rates do not depend on the concavity of the utility function. See Boone and
Bovenberg (2002) for details.
13If one assumes that skills n are lognormally distributed, it is typically the case (as in
figure 1) that equation (10) is downward sloping for values of n close to n0. If nw < n
14
constraint (11), denoted GBC, is downward sloping in equilibrium. The LS
curve models the optimal trade-off between the incentive constraints (i.e.
first-order incentive compatibility and the participation constraint) at dif-
ferent employment levels. In particular, if λE increases, consumption as
determined by (12) falls for each working type n. Hence, an agent needs to
be more productive to meet the participation constraint (u (nw) = v (b) + γ)
and nw goes up (i.e. employment falls). More generous welfare benefits and
larger search costs reduce labor supply by raising productivity standards,
thereby shifting the LS curve to the right in (nw, λE) space. An alternative
interpretation of (10) is that this relationship captures the marginal benefits
of using active labor-market policies (rather than passive welfare benefits) as
an instrument to combat poverty. These benefits rise with the level of un-
employment. More generous welfare benefits and larger search costs reduce
these benefits, thereby shifting the upward-sloping relationship (10) down-
ward in (nw, λE) space. The GBC curve represents the costs of these active
labor-market policies.
As shown in figure 1, the LS curve features an asymptote at nw = ñw in
(λE, nw) space. In order to interpret ñw, we define g (nw, λE) as government
expenditure that can be financed (with a marginal utility cost of public funds
λE and a marginal skill level nw)
g (nw, λE) ≡ s̄
Z n1
nw
{[tf (t)− [1− F (t)]] v (x (t))− f (t)x (t)} dt
−nw (1− F (nw)) s̄ (v (b) + γ) + b [1− (1− F (nw)) s̄] ,
where x (t) is determined by equation (12).







 > 0 if nw ∈ [n0, ñwi= 0 if nw = ñw
< 0 if nw ∈ hñw, n1]
.
Furthermore,
T (ñw) + b > 0.
then one gets a violation of the monotonicity constraint and (10) needs to be ironed out
to find the equilibrium values of nw and λE (see Boone and Bovenberg (2002) for details).
Assuming that the monotonicity constraint is not binding is equivalent to assuming that
nw > n. Note that for nw > n close to n it is the case that small shifts in GBC have little
effect on λE. This we use in the proof of lemma 5.
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At nw = ñw, the government collects the largest possible tax revenues
(net of spending on welfare benefits). Accordingly, g (ñw, λE) is the max-
imum amount of government spending E that can financed. A Leviathan
government, which maximizes tax revenues g (nw, λE) and thus sets nw = ñw,
distorts the extensive margin (i.e. T (ñw) + b > 0) because this allows it to
collect more tax revenues from types nw > ñw. Indeed, by leaving type n0w
for which T (n0w) + b = 0 out of the labor force, types nw > n
0
w can no longer
mimic n0w, so that the government can raise more tax revenues from these
types nw > n0w. To offset the adverse effects of additional employment on
tax revenues from higher types, the government budget must benefit directly
from the employment of a marginal type (i.e. T (ñw) + b > 0).
In the solution to the planner’s problem, we have nw < ñw. Accordingly,
employment is subsidized in the sense that a reduction in employment would
yield additional revenues (i.e. ∂g(nw,λE)
∂nw
> 0). The government budget con-
straint (11) is thus downward sloping over the relevant range (i.e. around the
equilibrium value determined by (10) and (11)):14 a higher level of employ-
ment (i.e. a decrease in nw) harms the government budget and thus requires
an increase in the marginal cost of public funds λE to bring the budget back
into balance.
Weymark (1987) explores how the rank-order weights φ (.) affect agents’
utilities in a model with quasi linear preferences but without a participation
margin. This analysis suggests the following result. Compare two rank order
weights φ (.) and φ̃ (.) such that φ̃ (n) > φ (n) for all n ∈ [n0, ñi while φ̃ (n) <
φ (n) for all n ∈ hñ, n1] (and
R n1
n0
φ (t) f (t) dt =
R n1
n0
φ̃ (t) f (t) dt = 1). Then
under φ̃ (.) utility is higher for low types, while it is lower for high types
compared to utility under φ (.). Doing the same exercise with a binding
participation margin, we find the following additional effects. First, equation
(9) implies that xw is the same under φ (.) and φ̃ (.). Second, the LS curve
rotates around some skill n < ñ. For values of nw above ñ the LS curve











G (n1) − G (nw) . For values of nw close to n0, in contrast, the LS curve











G (n1) − G (nw).15 Thus, if the LS curve rotates around a point above nw
(i.e. φ̃ puts relatively more weight not only on unemployed but also low
14This assumes that search costs γ are positive. If γ = 0, the government budget con-
straint is horizontal at the equilibrium. Intuitively, in the absence of search costs, inducing
agents to search through active labor-market policies does not involve any budgetary costs.




φ̃ (t)− φ (t)
i
f (t) dt = 0 implies thatR n1
n0
φ̃(t)−φ(t)
t f (t) dt > 0 since φ̃ exceeds φ for high values of
1
t , while φ exceeds φ̃
for low values of 1t .
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skilled workers), employment rises as a result of lower average taxes T (n)
for n close to nw. Finally, consider the GBC. The shift in weights from φ to
φ̃ reduces consumption for high types (see equation (12) for given λE and
using the impact of shifting rank-order weights on G (n1) − G (nw) derived
above) and raises consumption for low types. With the possible exception
of types nw very close to n0, this shifts the GBC downwards. As a result
of the shifts in the two curves, a change in the welfare weights from φ to
φ̃ boosts employment. Intuitively, the government draws more low-skilled
workers into the labor force to make them better-off (recall that b is fixed
here). Furthermore, the lower implicit tax burden on the extensive margin
goes together with reduced consumption for high types n < n1 because of
higher marginal tax rates on the intensive margin.
We now characterize the marginal tax rate, utility, gross income and
welfare.
Proposition 3 The solution for the marginal tax rate can be written as
τ (n) = 1−
G(n1)−G(n)
λE
+ f(n)n− [1− F (n)]
nf (n)
, (15)
for n ≥ nw .








v (x (t)) dt
¶
,





{[tf (t)− [1− F (t)]] v (x (t))− x (t) f (t)} dt
−F (nw) b− Ē
¸
.
Gross income of a type n ≥ nw is determined by
z (n) = n (v (x (n))− u (n)) .
Overall welfare amounts to




(G (n1)−G (n)) v (x (n)) dn.
Clearly, the marginal tax rate has the well known property of no distor-
tion at the top (i.e. τ (n1) = 0). Using equation (11) above to assess the
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expression forK, one finds that u (nw) = Knw = v (b)+γ. Since x (n) has been
characterized in equation (12) and u (n) is described in terms of x (n) and
K, we can employ u (n) = v (x (n)) − z(n)
n
to determine gross income z (n).
Finally, we can characterize overall welfare in the optimum by a surprisingly
simple expression.
Lemma 1 assumes an interior solution for nw > n0. However, in terms
of figure 1, the GBC curve may be everywhere below the LS curve so that
nw = n0. Hence, all agents search for employment and all unemployment is
involuntary. The participation margin may then still be binding (in the sense
that the unconstrained solution would yield u (n0) < v (b)+γ; see Boone and
Bovenberg (2002)). In that case, the marginal tax rate on the lowest skill is
positive (i.e. τ (n0) > 0). This result contrasts with the familiar result from
the optimal tax literature that, in the absence of bunching at the bottom
and a participation constraint, the lowest skill should face a zero marginal
tax rate (see Seade (1977)). Intuitively, with a binding search constraint, the
government is forced to raise utility u (n0) = v (b)+γ of the least skilled type
n0 above the level (associated with a zero marginal tax rate τ (n0) = 0) chosen
in the absence of this constraint. To prevent higher skills from mimicing the
more attractive income bundle of the lowest type n0, the government distorts
work effort of this latter type. In particular, by reducing (net and gross)
incomes x(n0) and z (n0) , a strictly positive marginal tax rate τ (n0) > 0
makes the income bundle (x (n0) , z (n0)) less attractive for higher types.
This result of a positive marginal tax rate at the bottom parallels that of a
monopolist engaging in second-order price discrimination by offering a menu
of goods with different qualities and prices. As shown by Mussa and Rosen
(1978), such a monopolist offers an inefficiently low quality level to the lowest
type in order to be able to extract more rents from buyers featuring higher
reservation prices. Also in that application, the participation constraint of
the lowest type gives rise to a distortion at the bottom. In our application,
the government optimally adjusts the taxation of low-skilled agents in order
to induce these agents to continue to look for work, while at the same time
minimizing the tax revenues that have to be given up to higher types. This
result of a positive marginal tax rate at the bottom illustrates the importance
of examining the tax system in conjunction with social assistance. Indeed, the
government reduces the tax burden on low-skilled workers as an instrument
to contain spending on welfare.
4.2 Comparative statics
This sub-section characterizes the effects of changes in public expenditure E
and welfare benefits b if the participation margin is binding. The effects of
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E on nw and λE follow directly from figure 1.














More public spending raises the marginal costs of active labor-market
policies, which as indicated above are a net drain on the government bud-
get (since nw < ñw). As a direct consequence, marginal skills nw leave the
labor market. In the Ebert (1992) version of the model (that is, in the
absence of an extensive margin), higher government spending does not im-
pact the shadow price of government spending λE and hence leaves marginal
tax rates (which given λE are determined by (15)) unaffected. The reason
why public spending does not affect λE is that a uniform increase in labor
taxes (i.e. dT (n) = dT > 0 for nw ≥ n0) acts as a lump-sum tax in the
Ebert model. With the additional behavioral margin of extensive labor sup-
ply, however, the government can no longer finance additional government
spending in this non-distortionary manner: the binding participation margin
implies that a uniform increase in labor taxes causes the marginal worker
nw to stop searching. To alleviate these distortions on the extensive labor-
supply margin of low-skilled workers, the government raises a relatively large
share of the required additional tax revenues from higher skills. The implied
increase in marginal tax rates induces workers to substitute away from con-
sumption towards leisure. As public spending increases, the implied distor-
tions on the intensive labor-supply margin worsen, thereby further increasing
the marginal costs of public spending. Equation (34) in the appendix writes













1−F (nw)τ (nw). Whereas the first term (between
square brackets) stands for the marginal cost in the absence of behavioral
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responses, the second term 1
1−χ represents additional costs as a consequence
of behavioral responses on the extensive margin.
We now turn to the question whether higher welfare benefits lead to the
introduction (or extension) of an EITC. For instance, a government more
concerned with the well being of those people without a job tends to raise
the benefit b. Does such a government mitigate the adverse effects of higher
welfare benefits on labor-market search by reducing the taxes paid by workers
at the bottom of the income distribution and phasing out these tax cuts for
low-skilled workers by raising marginal tax rates for all working agents?








for E ∈ hĒ, g (ñw, λE)i and γ ∈ h0, γ̄i.
If τ (nw) > 0 and
dτ(n)
dn
≤ 0 around nw and a rise in b is not Pareto improving,
the results above hold irrespective of the values for Ē and γ. Moreover, in




for n close to nw.
Larger welfare benefits raise unemployment through two channels. First,
the marginal cost of active labor-market policies increase as higher in-work
benefits have to be paid to low-skilled agents in order to induce them to en-
ter the labor market. This effect shifts the GBC curve upward. Second, the
marginal benefits of active labor-market policies decrease as the welfare sys-
tem takes on a larger role in combatting poverty. As a direct consequence,
less redistribution has to be carried out through the tax system. Indeed,
a higher welfare benefit raises the productivity requirements for marginal
workers, xw, so that the LS curve shifts down. With the marginal costs of
these policies rising and the associated benefits falling, voluntary unemploy-
ment unambiguously rises. With higher welfare benefits, society relies more
on these passive benefits rather than on in-work tax benefits to redistribute
resources towards low-skilled agents.
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The impact of larger welfare benefits on λE and hence (see (15)) on mar-
ginal tax rates for workers τ(n) depends on which effect is stronger: the fall
in the social benefits of active labor market policies or the increase in costs of
these policies. The cost effect dominates if in (nw, λE) space the downward-
sloping GBC curve is relatively flat compared to the upward-sloping LS curve.
This is in fact the normal case, implying that a higher welfare benefit typ-
ically increases the marginal costs of public funds λE and hence marginal
tax rates.16 In particular, the cost effect dominates and the normal case
thus holds if search costs γ are relatively small (so that the GBC locus is
relatively flat) or public spending E is large (so that the LS curve is close
to its asymptote ñw and this curve is therefore steep). Furthermore, λE and
thus marginal tax rates τ (n) increase with b if marginal tax rates are positive
and decline with skill close to the marginal worker nw and if higher welfare
benefits are not Pareto improving.17 In the normal case, in addition to the
unemployed, also marginal workers (i.e. workers with skills close to nw) ben-
efit from higher welfare benefits as the government reduces the labor taxes
paid by these marginal workers. In-work benefits for low-skilled agents and
welfare benefits are thus complements: in-work benefits help to offset the
impact of more generous social assistance on the participation constraint.
These additional in-work tax benefits for low-skilled workers are financed
through higher tax rates on skilled workers, implying higher marginal tax
rates for workers and a more progressive labor tax system.
The relationship between welfare benefits and the level of in-work benefits
appears to be U-shaped. At low welfare benefits, the participation margin
is not binding. As welfare benefits are raised from such low initial levels,
these benefits absorb the budgetary room for generous in-work benefits as an
instrument to fight poverty.18 At low welfare benefits, social assistance and
in-work benefits are thus substitutes in fighting poverty. As welfare bene-
fits are increased further, however, the participation constraint for marginal
workers becomes binding and the government needs to raise in-work benefits
to encourage agents to look for work. At high levels of social assistance,
16The benefit effect dominates the cost effect (and the marginal cost of public funds
λE thus declines) only if the curve (10) is flat enough. This curve is flat if agents are
almost bunched in the sense that consumption levels do not rise quickly with n. That is,
the equilibrium value of nw is close to n in figure 1. In that case, the higher productivity
requirements associated with a higher welfare benefit induce a substantial number of agents
to stop searching, thereby saving substantial search costs (especially because the steep
government budget curve signals that search costs γ are high).
17Although we do not analyze the case in which b is set to maximize welfare, it seems
reasonable to exclude the case in which a rise in b yields a Pareto improvement.
18For a formal analysis of the comparative statics of higher welfare benefits in a model
without a binding participation constraint, see Boone and Bovenberg (2002).
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therefore, in-work benefits and welfare benefits become complements. This
U-shaped relationship between in-work benefits and social assistance reveals
that generous in-work benefits are called for in both countries with low and
high welfare benefits, but for different reasons. In countries with low wel-
fare benefits (such as the United States), in-work benefits help to alleviate
poverty. In countries with more generous social assistance (such as most
European countries), in contrast, in-work benefits protect the incentives to
participate in the labor market.
4.3 Negative marginal tax rates
This sub-section considers the case in which in-work benefits are so large
that the implicit tax rate on employment is actually negative so that search
is subsidized, i.e. b+ T (nw) < 0.
Proposition 6 If nw > n0, it is possible that
ηw < 0,
b+ T (nw) < 0,
τ (nw) < 0.




for all types n > nw where τ (n) < 0.
With voluntary unemployment, the government can thus optimally pro-
vide a search subsidy to marginal workers nw. The condition for the optimal
level of voluntary unemployment f (nw) s̄λE (b+ T (nw)) = ηwu
0(nw) (see
the Appendix for a derivation) implies that a search subsidy for the marginal
worker b+T (nw) < 0 is associated with a negative Lagrange multiplier on the
participation constraint ηw in the government’s optimization problem (7). A
further increase in employment thus harms welfare. Moreover, the negative
shadow value ηw implies that the participation restriction u (nw) = v (b) + γ
is binding from below: u (n) ≤ v (b)+γ for n < nw is the relevant constraint.
Instead of attracting types n ≥ nw into work, the government wants to keep
types n < nw out of the labor force. This provides a rationale for hiring
and firing costs. Employment could also be discouraged by imposing a mini-
mum earnings requirement on jobs. Hence, by prohibiting jobs that earn less
than zmin > 0, the government facilitates generous tax benefits to low-skilled
workers.
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In the presence of search subsidies b+ T (nw) < 0, the government faces
a trade-off between redistributing to agents with low productivity and con-
taining search costs γ.19 With exogenous welfare benefits, it can redistribute
to low productivity agents only by providing rather generous in-work bene-
fits. Additional redistribution, however, results in more entry into the labor
force. With a negative implicit tax rate on employment b + T (nw) < 0,
the government budget bears part of the search costs associated with this
additional entry: an increase in employment implies a direct burden on the
government budget, as the additional in-work benefits −T (nw) exceed the
welfare benefit b the government saves. These additional budgetary costs of
redistribution stop the government from redistributing more to the bottom
of the skill distribution and explain why ηw is negative. Search subsidies
are likely to be optimal if not only b but also E is rather low (so that the
government has the budgetary means to provide generous in-work benefits
to unskilled workers), while at the same time search costs γ are high (so that
the government wants to contain entry costs).
Proposition 6 overturns the standard result from the literature on optimal
non-linear income taxation that marginal tax rates should be positive in the
interior of the skill distribution. The negative marginal tax rate τ (nw)20
can be explained in two ways. First, the government likes to redistribute
to less productive agents but at the same time wants to avoid excessive
search. Search is excessive here due to the externality on the government
budget constraint: agents at the bottom of the skill distribution do not
take into account that finding a job is a drain on the government budget
T (nw)+b < 0. To reconcile the objectives of alleviating poverty and avoiding
19In the presence of search subsidies, voluntary unemployment can exist only with posi-
tive search costs. Indeed, agents refrain from search only if they have to incur search costs
in order to take advantage of the higher public benefits in employment (i.e. −T (nw) > b).
20Crucial for the result that marginal tax rates can be negative is that the government
can not freely set b to optimize social welfare in our setting. If the government could
increase the welfare benefit b, it would employ this instrument to alleviate poverty. In this
way, it could redistribute resources to low-skilled agents without having to rely on in-work
benefits that require low-skilled agents to engage in costly search. With inward migration,
however, the government may find it hard to affect the outside option of migrants. Indeed,
a government facing inward migration of low-skilled labor may want to make the tax system
less progressive compared to the case in which it does not face the participation constraint
of migrants. Moreover, the welfare benefit b may be set by another government agency
than the tax authorities determining labor taxes. The tax authorities may thus have to
treat b as being exogenous.
Alternatively, we could allow for a more general search cost function γ (s) then the one
used above. In that case, we show in Boone and Bovenberg (2002) that we get the same
expression for the marginal tax rate as Saez (2002). Saez shows that in that case negative
marginal tax rates are possible even if the government sets b optimally as well.
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excessive search, it grants the largest in-work subsidies to skill types above
nw rather than to the marginal worker nw (as this would draw types n < nw
into the labor force). Hence, the marginal tax rate is negative at nw.
The second way to explain the negative marginal tax rates is as follows.
In order to separate the types at the bottom of the labor force (and thus
make it unattractive for the types below nw to mimic type nw by searching
for a job), the government induces marginal workers nw to supply excessive
labor on the intensive margin (which is cheaper for type nw than for types
below nw), implying that excessive labor supply on the extensive margin
spreads to the intensive margin. Indeed, in contrast to traditional optimal
tax problems, the self selection constraints are binding from below in the
sense that they prevent low types from mimicing high types (rather than
preventing high types from mimicing low types).
As noted in lemma 4, more public spending reduces employment. In the
presence of search subsidies, this helps to alleviate excessive employment.
This side benefit of higher public spending contains the marginal cost of
public funds. Indeed, expression (16) implies that the marginal costs of
public funds are below G(n1), its level in the Ebert (1992) model without a
binding participation constraint.21
5 Conclusions
This paper has explored how the income tax system should optimally respond
to an exogenously given welfare benefit in the presence of costly labor-market
search and non-verifiable skills. We showed that optimal unemployment is
determined by the requirement that distortions on the extensive margin bal-
ance those on the intensive margin. On the one hand, generous in-work
benefits help to alleviate distortions on the participation margin by encour-
aging more low-skilled workers to actively look for work. On the other hand,
such benefits make it more attractive for high-ability agents to mimic lower
ability agents, thereby distorting work effort. The government thus faces a
trade-off between boosting (low productive) employment and raising work
effort of higher skilled workers. If the government lacks information on in-
dividual skills, a distorted participation margin in the form of a positive
implicit tax rate between non-employment and employment is therefore the
price for combatting poverty while at the same time protecting labor supply
21The first term at the right-hand side of (16), G(n1)−G(nw)1−F (nw) , is declining in nw and is
thus smaller than G(n1) if nw > n0. The second term is smaller than one if T (nw)+b < 0.
Hence, λE ≤ G(n1).
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of higher skilled workers. A similar trade-off appears in determining opti-
mal retirement schemes. In particular, rather than linking public retirement
benefits to the retirement age in an actuarially fair way, the government may
want to favor early retirement to aid low productivity individuals suffering
from poor health (see Cremer, Lozachmeur, and Pestieau (2002)).
In the presence of low search costs, low welfare benefits, a concentrated
skill distribution and large public spending, the government may find it opti-
mal to employ a progressive tax system providing generous in-work benefits
to low-skilled workers in order to induce all agents to search. Such a progres-
sive tax system features a positive marginal tax rate at the bottom. This
contrasts with the familiar result from the optimal tax literature that, in
the absence of bunching at the bottom, those with the lowest skills should
face a zero marginal tax rate (see Seade (1977)). This new result shows that
the welfare system and the participation margin may importantly affect the
optimal tax system.
Social assistance and positive search costs may overturn also the well-
known result from the optimal tax literature that marginal taxes should be
positive in the interior of the income distribution. We showed that the gov-
ernment may optimally increase in-work benefits with gross income (implying
a negative marginal tax on work effort) in order to limit excessive entry into
the labor market. In particular, whereas low tax levels combined with posi-
tive marginal tax rates at the bottom help to encourage search if labor-force
participation of low-skilled workers is taxed on a net basis, negative mar-
ginal taxes rates for low-skilled workers help to discourage excessive entry
of low-skilled workers if this entry is subsidized. This latter case provides a
rationale for minimum wages and hiring and firing costs.
The incorporation of labor-market imperfections and the welfare system
into a model of optimal non-linear income taxation enabled us to investigate
how these new elements impact the optimal income tax. We showed, for
example, that more generous welfare benefits tend to raise marginal tax rates,
as the government cuts the average tax burden on low-skilled workers in order
to encourage these workers to continue to look for a job. Accordingly, skilled
workers finance not only more generous social assistance, but also a lower
tax burden of low-skilled workers.
In future research, we would like to investigate optimal tax policy if the
government can simultaneously set welfare benefits, search obligations, and
other categorical social insurance benefits (such as disability benefits based
on a signal of skill type). A study of these issues would need to allow for im-
perfect information on search behavior, household structure, and skill types.
In exploring the optimal trade-off between passive welfare benefits and active
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
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First we state the following result for reference below (for a proof, see
Boone and Bovenberg (2002)).
Lemma 7 With voluntary unemployment (i.e. nw > n0), the participation
margin is strictly binding (i.e. u (nw) = γ + v (b)). Furthermore, if γ > 0,
a binding participation constraint u (nw) = γ + v (b) implies z(n) > 0 for
n ≥ nw.
The Euler equations for maximizing (7) with respect to ω (.) , u (.) and
z (.) can be written as
ω (n) = argmax
ω≥0
λz (n)ω, (17)







λ0z (n) = −
λu (n)
n2







We assume that the monotonicity conditions are met so that λz (n) = 0 and









The first-order condition for maximizing individual utility with respect to
z (n) in equation (2) amounts to
v0
³
z (n)− T̃ (z (n))
´³






v0 (x (n)) =
1
n(1− τ (n)) .









λu (n) + λE s̄f (n)n− s̄f (n)φ (n) (22)
This is a linear differential equation that can be solved analytically (using
the method of the varying constant):
















for some constant c0.
With an interior solution nw > n0, the first-order condition for maximiz-
ing (7) with respect to nw amounts to
ηwu
0 (nw) = f (nw) {s̄ [−γ − v (b) + u (nw) + λE(b+ T (nw))]} . (24)
The transversality conditions22 are
λu (nw) + ηw = 0, (25)
λu (n1) = 0, (26)
λz (nw) = 0, (27)
λz (n1) = 0. (28)
The second transversality condition implies that differential equation (22) for
λu (n) can be solved as
λu (n) = −ns̄ [λE (1− F (n))− (G (n1)−G (n))] , (29)
which implies (together with (20)) that (12) holds. Solving this expression
for λE, we arrive at (10).




+ s̄ [λE (1− F (nw))− (G (n1)−G (nw))] = 0. (30)
We know from lemma 7 that an interior solution nw > n0 implies u (nw) =
v (b) + γ, so that we can write (24) as
ηw =
f (nw) s̄λE (b+ T (nw))
u0 (nw)
. (31)
Substituting (25) into (21) to eliminate λu (nw) , and using (31) to eliminate












the second expression. Since v0 (xw) = 1nw(1−τ(nw)) , we find (using (32) to







z (nw)− b− T (nw)
=
v (xw)− γ − v (b)
xw − b , (33)
where we have used (from the binding participation constraint) z (nw) =
nw (v (xw)− u (nw)) = nw (v (xw)− v (b)− γ) and T (nw) = z (nw) − xw to
eliminate z(nw) and T (nw) from the first equality in (33).



















and we have used incentive compatibility u0 (nw) =
z(nw)
n2w
to eliminate u0 (nw) .
The government budget constraint is given byZ n1
nw
f(n)s̄ [z(n)− x (n)] dn = E + [F (nw) + (1− F (nw)) (1− s̄)] b (35)
and the definition of u (n) allows us to write
z (n) = n (v (x (n))− u (n)) . (36)
To determine what u (n) looks like, we substitute this expression for z (n) into
the incentive compatibility constraint u0 (n) = z(n)
n2
to arrive at the following
differential equation:





v (x (n)) .









v (x (t)) dt
¶
, (37)
z (n) = nv (x (n))−Kw −
Z n
nw
v (x (t)) dt,
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for some constant Kw. We solve for this constant by substituting the last










Using (37), u (nw) = v (b)+γ can be written as 1nwKw = v (b)+γ. Substituting
the expression for Kw above, we establish (11).
We now show that the solution satisfies (13). First, consider (10). The
numerator is positive and decreasing in nw. Denote the denominator by
D (nw) ≡ 1− F (nw)− nwf (nw) + f (nw)
v0 (xw)
. (38)
The assumptions 1− n0f (n0) > 0 and v0 (x̂w) > 1n1 imply
D (n0) > 0,
D (n1) < 0.
Let ñw denote the smallest value such that D (ñw) = 0 (by continuity of f (.)
such a value exists).23 Hence, in (nw, λE) space, (10) features an asymptote at
nw = ñw (see figure 1). Since the numerator is positive, limnw↑ñw λE (nw) =
+∞. Furthermore, (10) is monotonically increasing in (nw, λE) space for





> 0 does not hold. Since equation (10) is identical to equation
(12) (where the relation between v0 (.) and λE is a positive one), this implies
that v0 (x (n)) is increasing in n for some n > nw, so that x0 (n) < 0 for these
values. This contradicts the monotonicity requirement x0 (n) , z0 (n) ≥ 0.





To determine the slope of (11), we define
φ (nw, λE) ≡
Z n1
nw
{[tv (x (t, λE))− x (t, λE)] f (t)− [1− F (t)] v (x (t, λE))} dt
−©nw (1− F (nw)) (v (b) + γ) + bF (nw) + Ēª .







φnw = − [nwv (x (nw, λE))− x (nw, λE)] f (nw) + [1− F (nw)] v (x (nw, λE))
− {[1− F (nw)] (v (b) + γ)− nwf (nw) (v (b) + γ) + f (nw) b}
= − (v (xw)− v (b)− γ) (nwf (nw)− [1− F (nw)]) + f (nw) (xw − b)
= (xw − b) v0 (xw)D (nw) > 0, (39)
23If f (.) satisfies the monotone hazard rate property, ñw is the unique solution to
D (ñw) = 0.
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whereD (nw) is defined in (38), and the last equality holds only for the values


























dt > 0, (40)
where we have used equation (12) to derive the third equality by eliminating
v0 (x (t, λE)). The sign of φλE follows because the concavity of v (x) together
with (12) imply dx(t,λE)
dλE
< 0. With φnw > 0 and φλE > 0, (11) is downward
sloping in (nw, λE) space at the point where (11) and (10) intersect.
Finally, the expression forW in the proposition can be derived by writing






v (x (t)) dt
´
,
substituting this expression into welfare








to eliminate u(n), and employing partial integration. This yields




(G (n1)−G (n)) v (x (n)) dn.
Substitution of u (nw) = v (b) + γ yields the expression in the proposition.
Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 2
From the definition of the asymptote ñw above, we have
D (nw)
 > 0 if nw < ñw= 0 if nw = ñw
< 0 if nw > ñw
.
The result in the lemma on ∂g
∂nw
follows from (39), xw > b and v0 (xw) > 0.







= − (1− F (ñw)) < 0,
32
so that v0 (x (ñw)) = v0 (xw) > 1ñw . This implies τ (ñw) > 0 and thus (from
(32)) T (ñw) + b > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
See proof of Lemma 1 above.
Proof of Lemma 4















nw (1− F (nw)) v0 (b)
+1
s̄









where φnw and φλE are defined in equations (39) and (40). The determinant
of the matrix on the left-hand side equals
det =
¯̄̄̄
¯ φnw φλE− dλEdnw ¯̄̄(10) 1
¯̄̄̄






















nw (1− F (nw)) v0 (b)
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dE| {z } .
<0
(42)




Proof of Lemma 5
Note that (from (12)) dλE




















nw (1− F (nw)) v0 (b) + 1
s̄












We thus obtain dλE
db
> 0 if φnw is close to 0, and
dλE
db





0. We consider these cases in turn. First, (39) implies that φnw is close to 0
if either xw is close to b or if D (nw) is close to 0. (14) reveals that xw − b is
close to 0 if γ is close to zero. Hence, γ̄ > 0 exists such that for all γ ∈ h0, γ̄i
φnw is small enough to ensure
dλE
db
> 0. Moreover, by continuity, D (nw) is
close to 0 if nw is close to the asymptote ñw in figure 1. By raising E, the
downward-sloping government budget constraint in figure 1 shifts upward so
that we can obtain an equilibrium value arbitrarily close to ñw. Therefore,
by choosing E sufficiently large (but below maximum government revenues
g (ñw,+∞)), φnw is close enough to 0 so that dλEdb > 0.
If (10) is downward sloping around n0 (as depicted in figure 1), a value
for nw exists (denoted by n in figure 1) where dλEdnw
¯̄̄
(10)
= 0. In this case, we
can find values for E such that the intersection of (11) and (10) is at nw > n
34
but is close enough to n so that dλE
db
< 0. More precisely, let E∗ denote the
value of E such that the intersection is at n. Then a value E∗ > E∗ exists
such that dλE
db
< 0 for all E ∈ hE∗, E∗i.
The effects of b on x (n) and τ (n) follow immediately from dλE
db
by using
(12) and (15), respectively.
Now we argue that dλE
db
< 0 can be excluded if dτ(n)
dn
< 0 around nw and
if a rise in b does not lead to a Pareto improvement. More precisely, we
show that dλE
db
< 0 and dτ(n)
dn
< 0 around nw imply that raising b does yield a
Pareto improvement.














v(b) + γ +
Z n
nw
v (x (t)) dt
¶






(v (b) + γ − v (xw)) dnwdb +
nw
n




























where we have used (9) to eliminate (v (b) + γ − v (xw)) . Differentiation of
v0 (xw) = 1/[nw(1 − τ (nw))] yields dnw/dxw ≤ n2w(1 − τ (nw)) (−v00(xw)) if














xw−b (1 − τ (nw)). Substitution of this


















Substituting v0(xw) = 1/[nw(1− τ (nw)] to eliminate v0(xw), we find that the
first term at the right-hand side of this equation is positive. Also the second
term at the right-hand side is positive if dλE/db < 0 (since (12) implies that
dx(t)
dλE
< 0). Hence, dλE/db < 0 together with
dτ(n)
dn
< 0 around n = nw implies
that all agents gain from a higher welfare benefit.
(44) implies that a value n∗ close to nw exists such that
du(n)
db
> 0 for all




< 0 for all n ∈ hnw, n∗i. Finally, rewriting (42) for the










db| {z } < 0
<0
for all n ∈ hnw, n∗i, where we have used that τ (nw) > 0 and hence τ (n) > 0
for n close to nw. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 6
Consider the case in which b+T (nw) < 0 and τ (nw) < 0. The first-order
condition for nw (see (24) with u (nw) = v (b) + γ) then implies that ηw < 0.
























Figure 1: equilibrium in nw, λΕ space is determined by the 
intersection of the Labor Supply (LS) and Government Budget 
Constraint (GBC) curves. The LS curve should be nondecreasing 
and hence must be ironed out for nw < n. Government tax 
revenues are maximized if nw =      .  wn
~
